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Abstract
In this article we analyze howmedia coverage for environmental actors (individual environmental activists and environmen-
tal movement organizations) is associatedwith their perceived policy influence in Canadian climate change policy networks.
We conceptualize media coverage as the total number of media mentions an actor received in Canada’s two main national
newspapers—the Globe and Mail and National Post. We conceptualize perceived policy influence as the total number of
times an actor was nominated by other actors in a policy network as being perceived to be influential in domestic cli-
mate change policy making in Canada. Literature from the field of social movements, agenda setting, and policy networks
suggests that environmental actors who garner more media coverage should be perceived as more influential in policy net-
works than actors who garner less coverage. We assess support for this main hypothesis in two ways. First, we analyze how
actor attributes (such as the type of actor) are associated with the amount of media coverage an actor receives. Second,
we evaluate whether being an environmental actor shapes the association between media coverage and perceived policy
influence. We find a negative association between media coverage and perceived policy influence for individual activists,
but not for environmental movement organizations. This case raises fundamental theoretical questions about the nature
of relations between media and policy spheres, and the efficacy of media for signaling and mobilizing policy influence.
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1. Introduction
Research on the relationship of media coverage to pol-
icy influence historically tends to assume a symmetry be-
tween mediated political communication and policy in-
fluence/power (Russell, Dwidar, & Jones, 2016; van Aelst,
2014). Previous analyses of themedia-policy link specific
to climate policy tend to focus either on influence within
policy networks or visibility withinmedia networks in iso-
lation and draw inferences about how the two spheres
are related based on a set of theoretical assumptions
(Stoddart, Ylä-Anttila, & Tindall, 2017). Herein we move
beyond theoretical assumptions by empirically examin-
ing the association between climate change related me-
dia coverage of environmental activists and environmen-
tal non-governmental organizations (ENGOs), and the in-
fluence these actors are perceived as having in a climate
change policy network.
With respect to policy influence, news media are
linked to public policy in two important ways. First, news
media provide the backdrop for contests between vari-
ous conflicting interpretive frameworks or ‘framings’ of
issues such as climate change, mobilized by interested
constituencies (Benford & Snow, 2000; Leifeld, 2017).
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Second, public policy is partly made through the in-
fluence that interested constituencies exert on policy
makers through news media coverage (van Aelst, 2014;
Vliegenthart, Walgrave, Wouters, et al., 2016). These en-
actments are shaped by a constellation of factors includ-
ing journalistic norms and practices, the strategies and
mobilization campaigns used by activists, industry and
trade, and the particular types of overarching formal po-
litical processes/opportunity structures at play (Hutchins
& Lester, 2015; Leifeld, 2017; Meyer & Minkoff, 2004).
Literature on the media-policy link from the fields of
agenda setting (van Aelst, 2014; Vliegenthart, Walgrave,
Wouters, et al., 2016; Walgrave & Vliegenthart, 2012),
policy networks (Kukkonen et al., 2018), and social move-
ments (Gamson, 2007; Malinick, Tindall, & Diani, 2013;
Meyer & Minkoff, 2004) suggests actors who garner
more media coverage should be perceived as more influ-
ential in the policy sphere compared to thosewho garner
less. Moreover, environmental actors have “stronger in-
centives to get media coverage than industry actors in
order to reach bystander publics and put pressure on
governments” (Stoddart, Tindall, Smith, & Haluza-Delay,
2017, p. 386).
However, research on the Canadianmedia and policy
spheres suggests that even if environmental actors are
more prevalent in media coverage, this media presence
may not always be positively associated with policy in-
fluence and outcomes. For example, recently in Canada
environmental actors are more prevalent than industry
actors in climate change related media coverage. At the
same time, the interests of environmentalists are rarely
reflected in climate policy, while those of industry often
are (Carroll, 2018; Stoddart et al., 2017).
Building on this observation we analyze how media
coverage of environmental actors is associatedwith their
perceived policy influence. We find that for individual ac-
tivists (those not acting on behalf of any formal organi-
zation), more media coverage is associated with less per-
ceived policy influence, while for environmental organi-
zations there is a small but significant positive associa-
tion between media coverage and perceived policy influ-
ence. We use interview data to expand on our findings in
our discussion.
This case raises fundamental theoretical questions
about how sociopolitical reality is enacted, shaped and
received through media, about the nature of relations
betweenmedia and policy spheres, and aboutwhether—
for activists—media success is a Pyrrhic victory (a victory
that ironically leaves the victor damaged to such an ex-




Political influence is a complex social phenomenon that
can be difficult to measure in a meaningful way in terms
of direct impacts on policy outcomes. Moreover, so-
cial influence may be conceived of and operationalized
in a number of ways. One possibility is to approach
influence as an objective, outcome-based measure to
study whether an actor objectively has had an influence
over other actors. For example, Vliegenthart, Walgrave,
Wouters, et al. (2016) examine how media coverage
of protest impacts question periods in European parlia-
ments (an outcomemeasure of influence). They find that
although media coverage of issues generally results in
questions in parliament pertaining to these issues (evi-
dence of a positive outcome of influence for activists),
this is an indirect effect mediated through the broader
issue agenda of mass media, which in turn is moderated
by national political institutions.
Another approach common in network analyses con-
ceives of social influence structurally, in terms of net-
work centrality (the sum of all incoming and outgoing
network ties an actor has) or structural equivalence (two
actors sharing a similar pattern of network ties to other
actors; Knoke& Yang, 2008). For example, Heaney (2014)
treats perceived influence as an outcome of actors’ struc-
tural location across multiple intersecting networks of
communication, policy issue overlap, and coalition over-
lap among policy network actors. Heaney finds that play-
ing a brokerage role in communication networks is partic-
ularly important to perceived influence, but this cannot
be clearly separated from the effects of issue overlap or
coalition overlap networks.
By contrast, Fischer and Sciarini (2015) gauge how
perceived influence (or ‘reputational power’) relates to
political outcomes and whether policy network actors’
understanding of the reputational power of others is ac-
curate. They find that policy network actors’ assessments
of each other’s reputational power are generally accu-
rate, though there may be perception bias whereby the
perceived influence of closer allies is overstated. Finally,
Ingold and Leifeld (2016) examine several German and
Swiss policy domains and argue that perceived influence
(or ‘influence reputation’) is a function both of the au-
thority derived from institutionally-defined roles, as well
as by actors’ structural locations in social networks.
These network studies of influence use exponen-
tial random graph models to simultaneously analyze
the multiple interdependent factors that contribute to
the perceived influence of policy network actors (for a
good overview of this approach see Lusher, Koskinen,
& Robins, 2013). At the same time, these studies all fo-
cus on how perceived influence is shaped by social dy-
namics that are primarily endogenous to policy networks
themselves, rather than focusing on how perceived in-
fluence can be shaped by external factors, such as me-
dia coverage.
We take neither of these approaches. We conceive
of social influence social-psychologically, as a subjective
evaluation (Gartrell, 1987) that actors make about other
actors (see Heaney & Lorenz, 2013, pp. 260–261, for
a good summary of this approach). This approach in-
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volves directly asking actors to subjectively evaluate the
influence of other actors. Heaney and Lorenz (2013) as-
sert that “although any one respondent is likely to have
an incomplete view of the field, [previous research sug-
gests] respondents collectively are expected to provide
a reasonably accurate rating of the levels of group influ-
ence” (p. 260).
While the network studies outlined above also use a
subjective measure of perceived influence, our analysis
offers an important addition to understanding perceived
influence within policy networks. Rather than focussing
on disentangling endogenous network processes, we ex-
plicitly examine an empirical correlation between media
coverage and perceived influence in a policy network.
This requires understanding how media and public pol-
icy are related.
2.2. Media and Public Policy
Generally, research related to media and policy falls into
two streams. The first is political communication, which
tends to focus on how media coverage impacts public
opinion and the government’s political agenda. The sec-
ond is political science, which tends to focus on howme-
dia functions as an information exchange for policy ac-
tors, and how media coverage of particular issues can
partly shape the political agenda (see Russell et al., 2016;
van Aelst, 2014). Notably, there is little integration of the
two streams (cf. Russell et al., 2016, p. 9), and both bod-
ies of literature tend to use a set of assumptions based
on linear/symmetrical relationships between media and
policy (Russell et al., 2016; van Aelst, 2014). We depart
from this tradition by employing the policy network and
discourse network analytical frameworks.
Policy network analysis seeks to uncover the actors
that are influential in policymaking and the interrela-
tions that exist between them (Knoke, 1990; Ylä-Anttila
et al., 2018). A policy network is a specific kind of so-
cial network, which can be generally defined as a set
of political actors embedded within a set of structured,
yet dynamic interrelations called network ties (Borgatti
& Halgin, 2011). Policy network actors socially interact
on the basis of particular policy issues (Leifeld, 2017;
Tindall, Stoddart, & Callison, 2018; Ylä-Anttila et al.,
2018). Actors include “government representatives, but
also opposition parties, businesses, social movements,
think-tanks, and scientists” (Stoddart et al., 2017, p. 389).
We also integrate a media discourse network per-
spective into our analysis. Discourse networks are con-
stituted by political discourses, which are “verbal inter-
actions between political actors about a given policy”
(Leifeld, 2017, p. 302). They involve political actors—
including politicians, environmentalists, scientists, think
tanks, business leaders, NGOs, and others—making pub-
lic statements about their policy beliefs, goals, and pref-
erences (Leifeld, 2017). Some such actors are those in-
volved in social movements.
2.3. Social Movements and Media Coverage
Studies of media coverage of social movements suggest
activists seekmedia coverage in order to build up reputa-
tion, enter into policy debates, impact public policy, and
exert influence over policymaking (Kukkonen et al., 2018;
Malinick et al., 2013; Wilkes, Corrigall-Brown, & Myers,
2010). Social movements engage in issue framing to try
to reshape the frameworks people use to interpret how
political issues impact their daily reality (Benford& Snow,
2000; Snow, Rochford, Worden, & Benford, 1986). This
potentially influences bystanders to identify with the po-
sition of activists, while also encouraging people to mo-
bilize (Snow et al., 1986).
For example, Stoddart, Smith, and Tindall (2016)
found activists used the COP15 climate meeting in
Copenhagen as a ‘political opportunity’ (Meyer &
Minkoff, 2004) to intervene in international media narra-
tives and re-frame Canada’s international reputation as a
climate leader. Activists drew international attention to
Canada’s poor climate change performance, generating
public awareness and political pressure (Stoddart et al.,
2016). This demonstrates that environmental groups are
able to act as “key organizational actors” (Stoddart et al.,
2016, p. 260) who play a role in structuring national and
international news media discourse, and “articulate sub-
stantive claims” (Stoddart et al., 2016, p. 260) toward
other political actors.
News media remain a key “field of engagement
among a range of actors with a stake in climate change
policy debate” (Stoddart et al., 2017, p. 386). The link
between climate change and media has been exten-
sively studied since about the mid 1990s, both within
and across multiple societies, and especially in Europe
and North America (Tindall et al., 2018). The type and
amount of climate change news coverage differs sub-
stantially across countries (Boykoff, 2011). Over the last
two decades the extent of media coverage of climate
change has fluctuated, rising in concert with major me-
dia events such as COP meetings and the release of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and
other reports, subsiding in the trough between (Boykoff,
2011; Broadbent et al., 2016). More recently, world me-
dia attention to climate change has been steadily rising
(Boykoff, Katzung, & Nacu-Schmidt, 2019).
Coverage in Canada is cyclical and event-driven.
Between 1997 and 2010, coverage of climate change
in Canada’s two major national newspapers—the Globe
andMail andNational Post—rose to a peak alongside the
release of the fourth IPCC report and the Nobel Peace
Prize being awarded to the IPCC and to Al Gore, and
declined thereafter (Stoddart, Haluza-DeLay, & Tindall,
2016). As of August 2019, coverage in Canada is up by
about 38% compared to August 2018 (Boykoff et al.,
2019). Canadian coverage is increasingly oriented to-
ward policy debates and discussion about proposed solu-
tions to climate change (Stoddart & Tindall, 2015; Young
& Dugas, 2011).
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In this analysis we are interested in whether, for envi-
ronmental actors (individual activists and ENGOs), media
coverage like that outlined above is positively associated
with perceived policy influence. We examine the empir-
ical correlation between media coverage of these envi-
ronmental actors and the extent to which other policy
actors subjectively perceived environmental actors as be-
ing influential in climate change policy making. Based on
the literature above, we propose two main hypotheses.
2.4. Hypotheses
The literature outlined above suggests that environmen-
tal actors are incentivized to garner media attention, and
that thosewho havemoremedia coverage should be per-
ceived as more influential by policy actors compared to
actors who have less media coverage. However, regard-
ing the second assertion, research on the Canadian me-
dia and policy spheres suggest the opposite may be true
for individual environmental activists. To assess these
claims, we test the following hypotheses:
H1: Being an environmental actor (either individual
activist or environmental organization) is positively
associated with media coverage.
H2: Being an environmental actor (either individ-
ual activist or environmental organization) mediates
the media coverage—perceived influence associa-
tion, such that media coverage is negatively associ-
ated with perceived policy influence.
For a variety of reasons, media coverage may not always
translate into perceived policy influence. What appears
in themedia is influenced by processes (such as journalis-
tic norms) that operate beyond the importance of partic-
ular policy arguments, or the extent towhich they appear
compelling (Boykoff & Boykoff, 2007; Callison, 2014).
Also, debates in media may not accurately capture the
“complexities of social interaction that occur within pol-
icy networks” (Stoddart et al., 2017, p. 387). Moreover,
key policy actors may vary in their “need and ability to
get media coverage” (Stoddart et al., 2017, p. 387). For
example, influential actors may engage in ‘strategic invis-
ibility’ (Lester & Hutchins, 2012), withdrawing from pub-
lic communication about environmental issues to avoid
negative media coverage. Therefore, a positive associa-
tion between media coverage and perceived policy influ-
ence should not be treated as axiomatic but rather as an




The data were gathered as part of the larger COMPON
(Comparing Climate Change Policy Networks) project,
which involved a discourse network analysis (Leifeld,
2017) of print news coverage of climate change in
Canada, and interviews with/surveys completed by
Canadian climate change policy actors. The media dis-
course data used here focuses on articles (N = 1,140)
fromCanada’s twomain national newspapers (Globe and
Mail and National Post) during the period between June
2006 to June 2010. This period was chosen because it en-
compasses critical events including the Copenhagen COP
meetings, which inspired contention and mobilization,
and thus media coverage. These articles were analyzed
usingDiscourseNetwork Analyzer (Leifeld, 2015), to iden-
tify actor agreement or disagreement across a range of
concept statements pertaining to climate change gover-
nance in Canada. This enabled us to generate a detailed
event list used to derive our media coverage variable.
In the interview and survey phase of the project,
77 respondents were interviewed beginning in February
2015, and 44 respondents completed online surveys be-
tween June 15th, 2015 and October 13th, 2016. The
sample was designed to be representative of actors
involved in climate change policy making in Canada.
Pertinent actor types represented in the sampling frame
included politicians, government bureaucrats, environ-
mentalists, scientists, think tanks, business leaders,
NGOs, and others.
The survey included five sections asking respondents
about their network behaviors with respect to a list of
network ‘targets’ (policy actors) that were systemati-
cally identified by the Principle Investigator of the origi-
nal COMPON project. All of the organizations associated
with survey respondents also appeared as targets in the
survey. There are 171 targets in total, representing the
range of policy-relevant actors. Our analysis is based on
these 171 target actors. The survey question we focus on
herein asked respondents to indicate who out of the 171
target actors they perceived to be influential in domestic
climate change policy.
3.2. Measures
Descriptive statistics for our main and control variables
are outlined in Table 1. We conceptualize media cover-
age as the total number of media mentions an actor re-
ceived in Canada’s two main national newspapers—the
Globe and Mail and National Post—over the duration of
our study. We conceptualize perceived policy influence
as the total number of times an actor was nominated by
all other actors in a policy network as being perceived to
be influential in domestic climate change policy making
in Canada. These represent ‘media coverage’ and ‘policy
influence’ respectively in the analyses below.
Our main independent variable is actor type, sum-
marized in Table 2. Each survey target was assigned one
of eight possible actor ‘types’ based on some key di-
mensions such as the sector they were located in (for
e.g., civil society, academia, government, business, etc.),
and the type of activity they undertook (for e.g., ac-
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for non-categorical variables (N = 171).
Variable Mean S.D. Min Max
Dependent variables
Perceived influence 6.46 6.24 0 23
Media coverage 7.04 12.16 0 78
Interaction terms
Activist X media mentions 0.18 1.38 0 17
ENGO X media mentions 0.82 3.69 0 29
Control variables
% Agree w/business 8.90% 19.81% 0% 100%
% Agree w/government 9.48% 17.16% 0% 100%
% Not in business/government 50.30% 41.10% 0% 100%
tivism/advocacy, research, governing, business, etc.).
Each actor type is modelled as a binary variable that
equals 1 if the target matches that type, and 0 if not. For
example, an environmental organization target would
have a value of 1 for the ‘ENGO’ type variable, and 0
for all other type variables. We excluded the govern-
ment type variable, which acts as our referent type. It
is important to include government actors in our analy-
sis because they are a key part of the media/policy link
(Vliegenthart, Walgrave, Baumgartner, et al., 2016).
Preliminary analysis indicated a potential ‘crossover
interaction’ (Baron & Kenny, 1986, p. 1174) betweenme-
dia coverage and perceived policy influence for individ-
ual activists and environmental organizations. Therefore,
in our final model we interact media coverage with being
an ENGO and with being an individual activist. These in-
teraction terms are summarized in Table 1 as well. These
are included to assess the extent to which being an indi-
vidual activist or environmental organization shapes the
correlation between media coverage and perceived pol-
icy influence. This speaks directly to ourmain hypotheses
related to policy influence.
We include variables to control for the percentage
of an actor’s media coverage that aligns with the same
themes associated with coverage of business and gov-
ernment actors. We also include a variable for the per-
centage of an actor’s coverage that is unrelated to either
business or government coverage.
Finally, we include two further dichotomous
variables—one controlling for whether actors are fed-
eral/national versus sub-national, and one controlling
for whether actors are organizations versus individuals.
While we do include individual activists as an actor type,
there are other actors in the analysis who are individuals
(for example, media actors).
4. Analytic Strategy
We use negative binomial Poisson regression, because
our main dependent variables are count measures
that follow the Poisson distribution and exhibit some
over-dispersion (Cameron & Trivedi, 2013, pp. 80–85).
Preliminary analysis showed that neither zero-inflated
nor zero-truncated regression were a better a fit to the
data (for details on model selection see Cameron &
Trivedi, 2013; Wilson, 2015). We use Huber–White ro-
bust standard errors to account for unequal error vari-
ance across observations. This is a common problem
with generalized linear regression models, including neg-
ative binomial regression. Huber–White robust standard
errors provide asymptotically correct standard errors for
models where the variance of residuals is unequal across
observations (Cameron & Trivedi, 2013, pp. 84–85).
The first model uses media coverage as the depen-
dent variable to assess the factors associated withmedia
coverage that an actor receives. The secondmodel is the
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for actor type variable.
Actor type Frequency %






Think Tank 6 3.51%
NGO 6 3.51%
Total 171 100.00%
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primary model, which regresses media coverage on per-
ceived policy influence. To disentangle the link between
media coverage and perceived policy influence for indi-
vidual activists and environmental organizations, we in-
clude our two interaction terms in this model. We now
turn to our results.
5. Results
The results of our first model related to media coverage
are presented in Table 3. All else being equal, actors per-
ceived as more influential are associated with more me-
dia coverage. Organizations receive less media coverage
compared to individuals, and federal/national actors re-
ceive more coverage compared to non-federal/national
(regional) actors.
Looking at our actor type variables (relevant to H1)
reveals that compared to government actors, business
actors and individual activists receive less media cover-
age whereas there is no significant difference for envi-
ronmental organizations, or any other actor type.
The results of our second analysis related to policy in-
fluence are presented in Table 4. Higher values of media
coverage are significantly associated with higher num-
bers of nominations as being perceived as influential in
policy networks (p < .05). The same holds for being a
federal/national actor compared to non-federal/national
(regional) actors (p < .01).
The higher the percentage of an actor’s media cov-
erage that aligns with the same themes associated with
coverage of business, the more influential they are per-
ceived to be (p < 0.10). There seems to be no signifi-
cant association between perceived policy influence, and
either (1) the percentage of an actor’s coverage that
aligns with government, or (2) the percentage of an ac-
tor’s coverage that is not related to business or govern-
ment themes.
Looking at our actor type variables suggests that,
compared to being a government actor, being a business,
research, or NGO actor is associated with fewer nomina-
tions of being perceived as influential.
Turning to the interaction terms (relevant to H2)
we find that for individual activists the association be-
tween media coverage and perceived policy influence
is significantly negative (p < .001), whereas for envi-
ronmental organizations the association is significantly
positive (p < .001). For individual activists, more media
mentions are associated with fewer perceived policy in-
Table 3.Negative binomial Poisson regression of perceived policy influence onmedia coverage,with robust standard errors.
Media coverage Model 1 Model 2
Perceived influence 0.093*** 0.093***
(0.014) (0.014)
Attributes (1/0)
Organization (0 = individual) −0.467 −0.569*
(0.241) (0.289)



















Pseudo R2 0.045 0.059
BIC −584.082 −569.058
N 171 171
Notes: * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
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Table 4.Negative binomial Poisson regression ofmedia coverage onperceived policy influence,with robust standard errors.
Perceived policy influence Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Media coverage 0.025*** 0.020*** 0.015** 0.011*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005)
Attributes (1/0)
Organization (0 = individual) 0.149 0.121 0.030 0.019
(0.174) (0.163) (0.207) (0.205)
Federal/National (0 = regional) 0.518*** 0.624*** 0.505** 0.545**
(0.139) (0.145) (0.163) (0.163)
Coverage type
% Agree w/business 0.719† 1.202* 1.268†
(0.390) (0.492) (0.500)
% Agree w/government 0.776† 0.416 0.453
(0.431) (0.441) (0.445)















Think Tank −0.050 −0.059
(0.354) (0.358)
Interactions
Activist X media coverage −0.130***
(0.033)
ENGO X media coverage 0.044***
(0.012)
Constant 1.316*** 1.174*** 1.423*** 1.450***
(0.175) (0.200) (0.248) (0.247)
Pseudo R2 0.028 0.036 0.056 0.063
BIC −681.579 −672.492 −651.802 −646.420
N. Obs. 171 171 171 171
Notes: † p < .10, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001.
fluence nominations. For environmental organizations,
more media mentions are associated with more influ-
ence nominations.
Both of our hypotheses are partially supportedbyour
results, and we have some interesting findings with re-
spect to the association between media coverage and
perceived policy influence for individual activists. To clar-
ify our results and draw out important implications for
theory and future research, we now turn to a discussion
of these findings.
6. Discussion
6.1. A Pyrrhic Victory
Recall that the interaction terms in Table 4 represent a
‘crossover interaction’ (Baron & Kenny, 1986, p. 1174).
In our case, being an individual activist moderates the
association between media coverage and perceived pol-
icy influence such that the association is negative. In
contrast, this association is positive for environmen-
tal organizations.
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This moderation effect comes into play for actors
who had at least eight media mentions. For reference,
the average number of media mentions for individual
activists in our data is about eight, and about nine for
environmental organizations. We can use our regression
model along with these averages to predict the total
number of nominations of being influential that an in-
dividual activist, or an environmental organization, may
receive. Using eight media mentions, activists are pre-
dicted to get four influence nominations while environ-
mental organizations are predicted to get 10 (p < .001).
To better illustrate this interaction, Figure 1 graphs
adjusted predictions of number of nominations of be-
ing perceived as influential for individual activists and
environmental organizations. To calculate these predic-
tions, we set the variables for percent of an actor’s me-
dia coverage related to business, government, and nei-
ther, to their mean values. We also assume that in-
dividual activists and environmental organizations are
both federal-level actors (this is a more conservative as-
sumption for activists, since many activists are not fed-
eral actors). Finally, we set the organization variable ac-
cordingly; for environmental organizations the variable
equals 1, whereas it equals 0 for individual activists.
When we consider environmental organizations, nei-
ther of our hypotheses is supported. Our results sug-
gest that environmental organizations receive about
the same amount of coverage as government actors
(Table 3), and that higher numbers of media mentions
are associated with more nominations as being per-
ceived as influential (Table 4). When we consider indi-
vidual activists, H1 is again not supported—individual ac-
tivists receive less coverage than do environmental orga-
nizations (Table 3). However, for individual activists, H2 is
supported—for individual activists, higher numbers of
media mentions are associated with fewer nominations
of perceived policy influence (Table 4). Thus, in certain
contexts media coverage may actually be a Pyrrhic vic-
tory for individual activists.
In considering existing theoretical assumptions
about the relationship between media visibility and per-
ceived policy influence, our analysis suggests that there
are other contextual factors—in our case, the type of
actor under consideration—that play an important role
in shaping this relationship. Our analysis demonstrates
that theoretical assumptions of a positive association
between media coverage and perceived policy influence
need to be carefully examined. This symmetrical rela-
tion should not be assumed but evaluated case by case.
Future research should seek to elaborate on the condi-
tions wherein a positive or negative relation holds.
Recall from our earlier discussion that media cov-
erage may not be associated with perceived policy in-
fluence due to a variety of factors—journalistic norms
(Boykoff & Boykoff, 2007; Callison, 2014), the complexi-
ties of policy networks not captured inmediated debates
(Stoddart et al., 2017), and variations in policy actors’
need for, and ability to garner media coverage (Stoddart
et al., 2017).
In addition, there aremany reasonswhy actorsmight
be selected for media coverage beyond being perceived
as influential by other policy actors. For example, policy
networks can provide a kind of social capital, and me-
dia actors can be drawn into policy networks through
this social capital structure to identify their news sources
(Malinick et al., 2013). Journalists do tend to have estab-
lished relationships with particular sources and rely on
them due to considerations of time and accuracy, and
the ability of sources to provide reliable, concise, and
coherent responses. This is likely a part of the effect of
perceived influence on media coverage and is currently
being explored by the authors elsewhere. Nevertheless,
we cautiously offer potential explanations of our key find-
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Figure 1. Adjusted predictions of perceived policy influence nominations based on number of media mentions, with 95%
confidence intervals.
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages 298–310 305
One possibility is that there is some form of insti-
tutional legitimacy afforded to environmental organiza-
tions as a result of ‘NGOization’—a process whereby
grassroots groups and their networks “shift from rather
loosely organized, horizontally dispersed, and broadly
mobilized social movements to more professionalized,
vertically structured NGOs” (Lang, 2013, p. 62). NGOs
seek to “influence decision making by gaining some de-
gree of insider status in institutions or in organizations
that initiate, prepare, legislate, or execute policy change”
(Lang, 2013, p. 22).
Moreover Lang (2013, p. 64) argues:
Emphasis is placed on organizational reproduction
and on the cultivation of funding sources. It fre-
quently results in increased recognition and insider
status in NGOs’ issue-specific policy circles. One ef-
fectmight be the containment and reframing ofmore
radical messages; another effect might be an orien-
tation toward institutional advocacy and away from
public displays of dissent.
By operating outside of (and in many ways overtly chal-
lenging) this institutional context, individual activists
may have a legitimacy ‘penalty’ levied against them. This
is consistent with literature on insider and outsider ac-
tivist strategies (Fogarty, 2011; Grant, 2004), and with
literature on the sociology of knowledge that shows or-
ganizational characteristics (such as funding) acting as
a “common heuristic for judging credibility and broad
political ‘allegiances”’ (McLevey, 2014, p. 55; see also
Choudry & Kapoor, 2013).
We can see the contours of these processes in our
interview responses. When asked about the role of envi-
ronmentalists in climate change politics, one prominent
government actor explains how the use of radical mes-
saging, displays of dissent, and challenging institutional
legitimacy leads to a lack of perceived policy influence:
I have worked with some [NGOs] that are really very
capable, like really smart and strategic, people who
kind of look at it and figure out what is the best way
for them to engage and make a difference and who
they can influence and how to influence them. So,
some of the most impressive people I know work
in NGOs. But I have also met some people that are
just kind of useless, frankly. I mean…some people…sit
there and say “I do not agree with this process,
I do not think industry should even be at this table.
I do not think any standard that anyone has set was
tough enough.” But they did not really shape any-
thing. Everybody in the room, including other NGOs,
were like “duly noted” and then we went back to try-
ing to reach an agreement. Right like if you did not
want to participate, why are you here?
Another possibility involves the ‘devil shift’ (Sabatier,
Hunter, & McLaughlin, 1987) and ‘angel shift’ (Leach &
Sabatier, 2005) phenomena. The devil shift is the ten-
dency of political actors to underestimate their own po-
litical influence,while simultaneously overestimating the
influence and malice of their opponents (Sabatier et al.,
1987). In contrast the angel shift is the tendency for polit-
ical actors to exalt themselves and their political partners
(Leach & Sabatier, 2005). These are social-psychological
processes mediated through political discourse.
We see these processes in some of our interview re-
sponses. When asked about potential solutions to cli-
mate change in Canada, one activist reveals how the fail-
ure of political actors to take meaningful action makes
them a more difficult obstacle to overcome, requiring
more drastic action:
If you looked at it when it first started, I would tell
you energy efficiency and incremental improvements
are the best way to go about it because then you
can achieve it without too many disruptions to the
economy. That is no longer the case. Now we need
to have disruptive action in order to make the most
effective changes that we can as quickly as we can.
So, in fact…what we have to do is becoming harder.
And there is still not a recognition in politicians…that
extreme things have to be done in order to avert the
disaster that is awaiting us.
When asked about the current state of climate change
politics in Canada, the same activist extolls the virtue of
their own position in the face of opposition:
The politics of climate change in Canada are very neg-
ative….It has been used as a tool by the present fed-
eral government to beat up on previous governments
and to offend….So it has been a very bitter kind of
battle….We have a strong desire to do the right thing
but…if we are not prepared to cap our emissions we
are not going to be able to achieve anything.
Moreover, the constellation of actors in the field of en-
vironmental policy also shapes how media coverage af-
fects policy influence (van Aelst, 2014). Earlier we out-
lined how the Canadian environmental policy field is
largely characterized by interlocking relations between
industry and state actors (Carroll, 2018). It is also true
that media coverage of sensational issues like the envi-
ronment has a high likelihood of influencing the public
and the policy agenda (see van Aelst, 2014, pp. 239–240).
When we consider this alongside our preliminary ex-
planations and interview data outlined herein, it is rea-
sonable to argue that there may be some push back—at
least from industry and/or government actors—against
individual environmental activists, whose main targets
are industry and state actors and existing political institu-
tions, and who are highly motivated to garner media cov-
erage. In contrast, the more consensus-oriented strate-
gies of environmental organizations could explain their
relatively more influential position. Alternatively, individ-
Politics and Governance, 2020, Volume 8, Issue 2, Pages 298–310 306
ual activists in more radical groups may be more promi-
nent inmedia coverage, while those inmoremainstream
groups may be less (cf. Malinick et al., 2013).
While this is by no means an exhaustive exploration
of possible explanations for our findings with respect
to individual activists, these two explanations are plau-
sible, supported by literature, and reflected in our inter-
view data.
6.2. Limitations
We acknowledge that the relationship between media
coverage and perceived policy influence is bidirectional.
That is, media coverage may be associated with per-
ceived policy influence, and being an influential policy
actor may garner more media coverage. To fully explore
this question requires analyzing longitudinal data. In an
ideal research design, researchers could try to model
how this relationship changes over time, how the intro-
duction of new actors into a policy domain affect this
relationship, or how different strategies used by actors
shape this relationship. While these are important ques-
tions, they are outside the scope of our analysis.
First, our analysis is not longitudinal but cross-
sectional. We assert that although a longitudinal design
is ordinarily considered a methodological improvement
on a cross-sectional one, it still may not adequately ad-
dress the question of bidirectionality. For example, con-
sider the bidirectional inter-relations between the issue
attention cycle and media coverage (Downs, 1972), or
themany associations betweenmedia coverage, actor in-
fluence, and political opportunity structures. Moreover,
cross-sectional methods can be quite robust. Recall that
exponential random graph models—a cross-sectional
method specifically designed to analyze network data—
have proven successful at disentangling the complex
network-based processes that shape influence in politi-
cal networks (see Fischer & Sciarini, 2015; Heaney, 2014;
Ingold & Leifeld, 2016).
Second, we are examining the correlation between
media coverage and perceived policy influence. In terms
of practicality, answering longitudinal questions is easier
to do with media data than with network data, given ac-
cess to actors and the resources required to gather net-
work data. Nevertheless, our analysis is one of the first
to empirically examine this correlation, the first we are
aware of using Canadian data, and an important addition
to extant literature on social influence in policy networks
as well as literature on social movements and media.
A third limitation of our analysis involves our mea-
sure of perceived policy influence. We have evidence
of an empirical correlation between media coverage
and perceived policy influence and examine that herein.
However, it may be argued that no single actor in our
policy network has complete information about all other
actors in our network, and that evaluations of influence
could be shaped by personal relations between network
actors (Heaney & Lorenz, 2013).
We argue—in line with Heaney and Lorenz (2013)—
that our measure is valid for two main reasons. First,
actors in our network are “uniquely knowledgeable of
the inner workings” (Heaney & Lorenz, 2013, p. 261) of
climate change governance in Canada. This agrees with
Fischer and Sciarini’s (2015) findings outlined earlier that
network actors’ understanding of the reputational power
of others is accurate. Second, our sample of policy actors
was designed to be representative of the climate change
policy domain in Canada and has very good coverage of
the key actors involved in climate change governance in
Canada.Wewill investigate other aspects of this relation-
ship in future analyses.
Finally, our discourse network data precedes our pol-
icy network data by about five years. It is not clear
whether or not this improves the validity of our analy-
sis (by acting as an informal time lag), so readers should
keep this in mind when considering our findings.
7. Conclusion
In this article we analyze how media coverage for indi-
vidual environmental activists and environmental move-
ment organizations is associatedwith their perceived pol-
icy influence in a climate change policy network. We find
that media coverage may be a Pyrrhic victory for individ-
ual activists, for whom higher levels of media coverage
do not correspond with higher levels of perceived policy
influence. This raises fundamental theoretical questions
about common symmetrical assumptions about the re-
lationship between media coverage and policy influence
(see Russell et al., 2016; Stoddart et al., 2017; van Aelst,
2014), and the efficacy of media for signaling and mobi-
lizing policy influence.
Our findings demonstrate these assumptions are
only partly correct and should not be assumed. Rather,
the link betweenmedia andpolicy should be an empirical
question, not an a priori assumption. The complex pro-
cesses shapingmedia attention and policy influencemay
be similar but are also independent. They play out in dif-
ferent sociopolitical contexts and are shaped by different
mechanisms. This highlights the importance of further re-
search that bridges media analysis and policy network
analysis in order to help us better understand how visi-
bility, power/influence, and policy influence work across
media spheres and policy networks.
Our study also addresses the “lack of connections be-
tween studies of the media and studies of public policy
processes” (Russell et al., 2016, p. 2), and calls for re-
search at the level of individual political actors, to help
clarify mechanisms that explain “why and when political
actors react to media coverage” (van Aelst, 2014, p. 234).
Our findings suggest that in a context where government
is increasingly hostile toward climate science and climate
activism (such was the case in Canada during data col-
lection for this project), media coverage of individual ac-
tivistsmay leadpolicy network actors to perceive activists
as less influential than environmental organizations.
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We put forth two potential explanations for these
findings. The first is related to processes of NGOization
and the various ways that political actors use heuristics
to judge credibility and political allegiance. The second
is related to the devil shift and angel shift phenomena.
Both explanations are supported by literature and our
interview data. Ultimately our goal is to provide empir-
ical, substantive findings to improve our understanding
of climate change governance, environmental activism,
and the media-policy link. We will explore some of these
explanations in future analyses, and the current analy-
sis provides a good foundation for these, and other simi-
lar studies.
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